something genuinely distinctive about each philosopher's point of view will have been lost.
In what follows I argue that such correction is especially needed on one crucial point of interpretation. There is a growing consensus that Kant and Frege ultimately agree on the nature of the generality of logic -more specifically, that, whatever else they might disagree about, Kant and Frege agree that logic's laws and forms are constitutive of all thought and reasoning as such, no matter what its object.
3 Now, such an interpretive claim is encouraged by the fact that Kant and Frege do make terminologically parallel claims about the nature of logic's generality, as I show below. Nevertheless, I will argue that such verbal agreement covers over a deeper conceptual disagreement -disagreement, in particular, over the nature of the thinking and reasoning that logic is taken to have in view.
For while Frege defines 'thought', and with it the subject-matter of logic, in terms of what can be true or false, Kant takes logic to be concerned with anything that can be understood. What is more, Kant takes this latter concept to be one that extends well beyond the sphere of theoretical cognition to what is involved in such acts as the issuing and heeding of imperatives and the expressing of aesthetic assessments.
I will conclude, first of all, that, once we see our way past the terminological (B76), and Kant clearly takes the scope of both understanding and also judgment to extend well beyond the theoretical sphere, to both practical acts of issuing and heeding commands and even to expressions of aesthetic satisfaction. Because of this, the sphere of logic itself -at least a truly 'universal or general [allgemeine]' logic -must also comprise within itself much more than the forms and laws of the theoretical use of understanding alone.
We can see that Kant accords this wider scope to his 'allgemeine' logic if we look a bit more closely at the account that Kant gives of the nature of the abstraction that is involved in arriving at its subject-matter, and the corresponding contrast that Kant draws between the way a general logic treats thinking and ways in which thinking is treated by other disciplines. Recall, as we saw at the outset, that Kant takes general logic to treat thinking and understanding as such, without concern for the differences among the objects to which they can be directed (cf., §2 Finally, Kant thinks that each of these two kinds of use of our understanding and reason bears a different relation to its object. In theoretical use of understanding, our thought is 'related to its object' by 'determining [bestimmen] the object and its concept', though the object itself 'must be given from elsewhere' (Bix-x; my ital. Let me conclude by noting one final element of Kant's views that places even more distance between Kant and the Fregean tradition -namely, the methodological role that Kant assigns to the logical forms across his 'Critical' system of philosophy. For it is precisely the subject-matter of logic that Kant takes to provide the key to the 'architectonic' of philosophy as a whole. Though many of his readers have found Kant's seeming obsession with architectonic to be itself grounded in some irrational motive, Kant himself thinks that the identification of some such principle for the unity of philosophy is necessary, if we are to claim that there is any rational unity to philosophy itself, if philosophy is to be genuinely 'rational cognition from concepts' (B741). Kant's proposal is that this principle is provided by our understanding or reason itself. It is only because we know that it is one and the same understanding, the same capacity for reason, that is at work that Kant thinks we can know apriori that the very same logical forms will be manifest, that each domain will be intelligible, and hence, we can allow our inquiry to be guided by these forms.
Frege, by contrast -along with much of the tradition after him -rests content with simply listing philosophical disciplines (cf., the opening of 'Der Gedanke', KS 342), leaving it entirely mysterious whether there is a principle that unifies them under one concept (let alone a rational one), or whether they simply hang together disjunctively or rhapsodically. Kant's commitment to a more general logic is thus a symptom of a deeper philosophical rationalism than Frege's. 11 It is thus only Kant, and not Frege, who can assert that understanding and reason functions as 'the highest point' to which we must 'affix', not just 'the whole logic', but with it, all of philosophy as well (B134n).
If we now recall that Kant takes the questions of philosophy ultimately to be subsumed under one most fundamental question: Was ist der Mensch? (cf., Br AA11:429
and Log §III AA09:25), then we can see that what is ultimately at stake for Kant in the proposal of his 'allgemeine' logic is nothing less than the question of the rationality of the principle which provides fundamental unity to human life. Without such a common and rational basis informing our concern with the true, the good, the beautiful, and the purposive, the de facto unity of these dimensions in ourselves would be no better than an accidental, disjointed aggregation of pursuits, tied to one another or to ourselves by brute, unintelligible contingency.
Kant's alternative conception of the generality of logic should thus be taken seriously not only by those who are committed to the unity of reason, as well as by anyone committed to the ultimate rule of reason throughout all aspects of human existence, but also by anyone with a hope that there is a reason for why human existence is the way it isin short, by anyone who hopes that the answer to the question 'What is a human being?'
lies within the scope of reason or rationality itself.
